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Gadamer and Nāgārjuna in Play:  Providing a New Anti-Objectivist Foundation for  
Gadamer’s Interpretive Pluralism with Nāgārjuna’s Help 
Nicholas Byle 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Hans-Georg Gadamer rejects objectivism, the position that an interpreter may 
come to a single correct truth concerning any particular object, in favor of interpretive 
pluralism.  What is not clear is how Gadamer grounds this position.  This ambiguity 
leaves Gadamer open to multiple objectivist counters, ones which he would not wish to 
allow.  The following argument, using a comparative and analytic approach, takes two 
concepts, pratītyasamutpāda (interdependence) and śūnyatā (emptiness), as they are 
deployed by Nāgārjuna to provide Gadamer with this much needed anti-objectivist 
foundation.  Specifically, the new foundation is anti-realist in which interpreters and 
objects of interpretation are metaphysically empty, or devoid of independent existence, 
and are ultimately dependent on their “position” in a cultural and historical horizon.  If 
there is no metaphysical object apart from the interpreter’s engagement with it, then there 
is no stable phenomenon to which objectivists may appeal.
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Introduction 
 
  This paper utilizes arguments presented by Nāgārjuna against svabhāva using 
śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda, to elucidate and support Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics, specifically his theory of interpretive pluralism, the view, 
simply put, that in contrast to a single true interpretation there are multiple legitimate 
interpretations of an object or phenomena.1 While reading Gadamer’s general theory of 
philosophical hermeneutics it is clear that he rejects objectivism, the view that for any 
object of interpretation there is a single correct understanding that one can come to know 
regardless of the interpreter’s cultural and historical situatedness.2  Though his primary 
aim may not be the refutation of objectivism, the argument he offers in Truth and Method 
is meant as an exclusionary alternative to objectivism.  What is not clear is whether or not 
he does in fact ultimately exclude objectivism, and on what grounds he believes he has 
done so.  Is it simply that we cannot get beyond our cultural situatedness and its requisite 
prejudices (Vorurteile)?3
                                                 
1 The phrase “interpretive pluralism” is borrowed from David Weberman, “A New Defense of Gadamer's 
Hermeneutics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Review 60, no. 1 (January 2000): 45.  However, 
variations on this phrase are fairly common in the secondary literature on Gadamer. 
  Is it that this situatedness is necessary for any understanding at 
 
2 See for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall, 2nd ed. (New York: Continuum, 2005), 236, 285, 297, 309, and 342. 
 
3 As will become clear in Chapter 1, “prejudice” carries a negative connotation that Gadamer wishes to 
“rehabilitate.” Some have suggested that Gadamer could have been more prudent in his choice of term, or 
that it should be translated as precommitment.  I maintain the traditional translation of “prejudice” with the 
explicit acknowledgment that it is meant to have both positive and negative connotations.  For critiques of 
Gadamer’s choice of “prejudice” see James J. Dicenso, Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth: A Study 
in the Work of Heidegger Gadamer and Ricoeur (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1990), 
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all?  These two common options, which are not mutually exclusive, are not enough to 
ground Gadamer’s interpretative pluralism.  In fact, as Chapter One will demonstrate, 
Gadamer’s metaphysical stance and foundation for his epistemology is ambiguous.4  By 
turning to the concepts of śūnyatā (emptiness) and pratītyasamutpāda (interdependence)5
Questioning Gadamer and his argument’s exact stance toward objectivism is in 
fact not new.  For example, Jens Kerstcher says in his essay “Gadamer’s Ontology of 
Language Reconsidered,” “The aim of this essay is to outline the extent to which Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutical ontology of language can indeed be interpreted as 
exemplifying an anti-objectivistic conception of language and understanding.”
 
it is possible to give Gadamer’s epistemological position of interpretive pluralism a firm 
anti-objectivist metaphysical foundation by moving beyond the subject/object dichotomy, 
which would then not only maintain but strengthen his overall argument.    
6
                                                                                                                                                 
97-102; Weberman, “A New Defense of Gadamer's Hermeneutics,” 47; E.D. Hirsch Jr., Validity in 
Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 258-64. 
  
Kertscher concludes that Gadamer does not deliver on his anti-objectivist motives.  
Similarly, David Weberman questions whether Gadamer’s alternative to objectivism is as 
 
4 Dividing epistemology from metaphysics or ontology in Gadamer’s (and Heidegger’s) work is admittedly 
artificial.  How we are as historical beings is intimately connected with how we understand for Gadamer.  
But these two terms and fields are being distinguished for heuristic purposes of clarity.  For one discussion 
of the relation between epistemology and ontology in Gadamer see Dicenso, 81-2. 
 
5 When translated, pratītyasamutpāda will be rendered as interdependence.  The more traditional 
translations, such as dependent co-arising, do not as obviously convey the term’s connotations being 
stressed in the present argument.  Dependent co-arising has the feel of origination while interdependence 
focuses on the necessarily dynamic and contextual constitution of “things.”  For other instances of 
pratītyasamutpāda being translated as interdependence see Peter D. Hershock, Buddhism in the Public 
Sphere: Reorienting Global Interdependence, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009); Joanna R. Macy, 
Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory: The Dharma of Natural System (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1991). 
 
6 Jens Kertscher, “"We Understand Differently, If We Understand at All"; Gadamer's Ontology of 
Language Reconsidered,” in Gadamer's Century:  Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Jeff 
Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Kertscher (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), 136. 
3 
 
objectivist-proof as Gadamer would believe.  As he states, “Intriguing as this view is, 
what exactly are Gadamer’s grounds for denying the existence of a uniquely correct 
interpretation of a text, object, or event? And how can pluralism escape relativism? 
Because I believe that Gadamer's writings are ambiguous on both questions, I begin by 
looking at the rationale underlying Gadamer's anti-objectivism.”7
As stated above, the following paper attempts to quell such debates by resolving 
this ambiguity with the aid of two Buddhist concepts, śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda, 
which will be further explicated in Chapter Two.  First, śūnyatā represents a larger 
argument against svabhāva, which, though some disambiguation of its various 
connotations will be provided in Chapter Two, may be translated as “essence.”  As with 
its Western counterpart, for something to have an essence or svabhāva it must exist 
independently of all other objects and any knowing subject.  Epistemologically, this 
would mean that there is an objective truth about that object.  If an argument against such 
an object, as existing inherently and independently, is successful, then, presumably, there 
is ultimately no ground of appeal for objectivism.  Given that Nāgārjuna equates śūnyatā 
and pratītyasamutpāda (MMK 24:18) his arguments supporting śūnyatā are largely based 
on how pratītyasamutpāda functions in the particular phenomena under investigation.  
Though this is given much greater attention in Chapter 2, pratītyasamutpāda generally 
asserts that nothing exists independently, whether it be causally, mereologically, or 
  While this secondary 
literature raises the question and points to such difficulties, they too do not make the 
specific point that the problem lies in how Gadamer connects his metaphysics and his 
epistemology.  
                                                 
7 Weberman, 46. 
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cognitively.  Of the three, cognitive dependence is the most vital; for even some “thing” 
that is mereologically or causally dependent on something else requires a cognitive 
distinction that makes subjects and objects co-dependent.  This, then, makes 
understanding or knowledge equally dependent on the subject as it does on the object, 
again making objectivism (and even subjectivism) untenable.   
 Though, strictly speaking, the following argument is not entirely comparative, it 
does presuppose some general parallels that allow Gadamer and Nāgārjuna to be brought 
into useful dialogue.  As such there are some general critiques of such approaches that 
must be dealt with.  After all is not the distance between Gadamer’s and Nāgārjuna’s 
horizons vast?  And can these two concepts be extracted from the overall Madhyamaka 
system without carrying the entire system with them?  And are there not explicit remarks 
made by Gadamer himself against comparative approaches and the results they tend to 
produce?  This last question must be dealt with first, as it is the most threatening.  
Gadamer does have a few general critiques of comparative approaches.   
Comparison essentially presupposes that the knowing subjectivity has the freedom to 
have both members of the comparison at its disposal.  It openly makes both things 
contemporary…Is it not the case that this procedure—adopted in some areas of the 
natural sciences and very successful in many fields of the human sciences, e.g., 
linguistics, law, aesthetics—is being promoted from a subordinate tool to central 
importance for defining historical knowledge, and that it often gives false legitimacy to 
superficial and arbitrary reflection?8
 
 
These are admittedly damning critiques of possible assumptions underlying and outcomes 
of comparative approaches.  But must one agree with Gadamer?  Are the characteristics 
he ascribes to such approaches necessarily essential to them?  First, the argument to 
follow does not (pre)suppose either a universal historically transcendent consciousness or 
                                                 
8 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 227.  It should be noted that although Gadamer appears to mean by such 
critiques all comparative approaches, Dilthey’s use and justification of comparative approaches are the 
specific target of Gadamer’s general remarks.   
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object linking Gadamer and Nāgārjuna.  Also, the following argument does not naively 
presuppose equal access to Nāgārjuna, Gadamer, and their respective horizons.  Given 
my own and presumably most of my readers historical and cultural horizons, the 
Gadamerian system is horizonally nearer, thereby making it more accessible.  Again, 
however, this does not mean that Nāgārjuna’s horizon is so distant as to be completely 
inaccessible to understanding.  This points to a more general problem with Gadamer’s 
critique.  How near must a horizon be for it to be accessible enough?  As an American 
my horizon is necessarily further from Gadamer’s when compared to a German scholar.  
This surely cannot mean, however, that I or any other non-German scholar cannot 
interpret and attempt to understand Gadamer’s work.  Similarly, the distance between an 
American scholar and Nāgārjuna is even vaster; yet again there must still be some 
legitimacy in such studies.  Are not all such endeavors at least attempts at Gadamer’s 
fusion of horizons?9  And are not such endeavors attempts to make the text speak here 
and now, to make it contemporary, to make the alien belong?10
This then points to another secondary benefit of bringing these two systems into 
dialogue.  Though the primary aim is to use Nāgārjuna to benefit Gadamer, Nāgārjuna 
and the general Buddhist framework also benefit from the exchange.  They are brought 
into a contemporary philosophical dialogue justifying the relevance of their voice in such 
matters.   There is a tendency, as Jay Garfield points out, to simply label these systems as 
   
                                                 
9 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 305. 
 
10 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 295, 325; Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on 
Language, Action and Interpretation, trans. John Thompson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), 60-1. 
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religious with the undertone that they do not have genuine philosophical import.11
 Of course one may counter this by saying that Gadamer’s intent concerned 
temporal distance, that the present horizon has a past, part of which is composed of the 
traditionary material to be interpreted and fused, and that Nāgārjuna and Buddhist 
philosophy generally do not belong to the Western philosophical tradition.
  
Hopefully what follows will at least shake this illegitimate prejudice, as Gadamer would 
or should want. 
12  However, 
distance need not be simply temporal or traditional.  Though Gadamer’s emphasis is on 
temporal distance he notes that it is not exclusive.13  This becomes more poignant when 
coupled with Gadamer’s assertion that there is really only one horizon.  As he states there 
are no isolated horizons.  Rather these are merely convenient and analytically necessary 
divisions of a single horizon.  If distance is not merely temporal but cultural, it may then 
be argued that the Madhyamaka system composes a portion of this single horizon.  If this 
is so, then there should also be some “fundamentally enabling prejudices” that grant us 
some kind of access to it.14
 In fact, Gadamer’s appraisal is not definitive; support for comparative approaches 
exists in both his predecessors and successors.  The most notable of his predecessors, 
 
                                                 
11 Jay Garfield, “Philosophy, Religion, and the Hermeneutic Imperative,” in Gadamer's Century:  Essays in 
Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2002), 97-110, esp. 99. 
 
12 This, in fact, is not true.  There are many instances in the history of Western philosophy where “Eastern” 
approaches have been influential.  Leibniz and Schopenhauer are notable examples.  
 
13 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 298 and 376n. 
 
14 Ibid., 280 and 295. 
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Martin Heidegger, had similar reservations concerning cross-cultural understanding.15  
However, through the course of an extended dialogue with a Japanese philosopher, 
Tezuka, Heidegger and his interlocutor were able to come to a more or less mutual 
understanding concerning their understanding of the being of language.16
 Finally, though less optimistically, it is possible to conclude with Donald 
Davidson that though there is no basis from which to conclude that all cultural and 
linguistic frameworks share a conceptual scheme, there is equally no basis for the 
conclusion that there exists conceptual schemes that are incommensurable.
  Using this 
dialogue as an impetus Wei Zhang continues, in Heidegger, Rorty, and the Eastern 
Thinkers, with a comparison similar to the one proposed here; though her focus 
concerned Heidegger and the Buddhist framework more generally.   
17  We can 
only be charitable while attempting to overcome linguistic, conceptual, and horizonal 
differences generally, a sentiment shared by Zhang with the added emphasis of 
overcoming debilitating dichotomies such as East and West (or, one may add, Analytic 
and Continental in the horizon of “Western” philosophy).18
 This all speaks to the positive possibility of bringing Gadamer and Nāgārjuna (or 
anyone for that matter) into dialogue.  But what are the specific reasons for this pairing?  
   
                                                 
15See Wei Zhang, Heidegger, Rorty, and the Eastern Thinkers: A Hermeneutics of Cross-Cultural 
Understanding (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), 50-1. 
 
16 Ibid., 57. 
 
17 Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 47, no. 1973-1974: 20. 
 
18 Zhang, 105.  Also see Jeff Malpas' justification for his comparison of Gadamer and Donald Davidson 
“Gadamer, Davidson and the Ground of Understanding,” in Gadamer's Century:  Essays in Honor of Hans-
Georg Gadamer, ed. Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2002), 195-6. 
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Though some of the rationale will be covered again at the beginning of Chapter 2, it 
would be beneficial to specifically state some here.  First, Gadamer is an inheritor of a 
philosophical tradition with some general and rather difficult goals, one of which is 
overcoming the subject/object dichotomy.  With Kant there was a relegation of the object 
as a matter of metaphysical discussion in favor of the universal subjective conditions of 
knowledge.19 However, the object is not completely diffused; as evident from his 
distinction between the noumenon and phenomenon, and his thing-in-itself.  
Epistemologically, this means that knowledge and understanding must adequate 
themselves to the object:  “Truth and error, therefore, and consequently also illusion as 
leading to error, are only to be found in the judgment, i.e. only in the relation of the 
object to our understanding. In any knowledge which completely accords with the laws of 
understanding there is no error.”20
                                                 
19 I would like to thank Michael DeJonge for reminding me of these points and providing general 
clarification.  For one interpretation of how Nāgārjuna would respond to Kant see Hsueh-Li Cheng, 
“Nāgārjuna, Kant and Wittgenstein: The San-Lun Mādhyamika Exposition of Emptiness,” Religious 
Studies 17, no. 1 (March 1981): 77-8. 
  Skipping ahead, Martin Heidegger, who to a great 
extent Gadamer is a continuation of, makes further progress in dissolving this dichotomy.  
Heidegger, for example, advances a theory of truth as events of disclosure of the Being of 
beings that are governed by historically and culturally determined relational matrices.  As 
such, only within these particular modes of disclosure is truth as adequation or 
correspondence possible.  However, there is a tension in Heidegger’s work between this 
approach and a tendency to hypostasize the Being of beings outside of history, culture 
 
20 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, 0th ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 384. 
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and language.21
But why use Nāgārjuna specifically to help accomplish these goals?  First, there is 
a matter of efficiency; Nāgārjuna and his commentators were kind enough to do much of 
the heavy lifting.  They form a tradition that has dealt with the very issues that arise in the 
following arguments.  Second, the fact that they do come from a different tradition means 
that they do not have the same prejudices.  Forcing ourselves and Gadamer (the more 
familiar) to dialogue with the less familiar forces the inherited prejudices to come to 
light, affording the opportunity to confront, and if necessary, alter them.  Gadamer and 
Nāgārjuna have a profitable balance of identity and difference.  Their presuppositions are 
similar enough to bring them into comprehensible dialogue.  Yet their difference is 
enough to help dis-close (or re-open) the ontological presuppositions underlying 
Gadamer’s work, and question them. 
  This then opens the possibility of using Heidegger to advance 
metaphysical realism and some correspondence theory of truth where the criteria of 
legitimate interpretation and understanding lie in the objects or beings themselves, i.e. 
objectivism.  For reasons that will become clear in Chapter One such position are 
untenable for Gadamer’s interpretive pluralism insofar as it leaves him open to objectivist 
critiques.  As such, a way must be found to ultimately move Gadamer’s system beyond 
the subject/object divide and metaphysical realism.  Again, the following argument 
accomplishes this through arguments presented by Nāgārjuna.   
 To accomplish the central aim of solidly founding Gadamer’s interpretive 
pluralism the paper will have the following structure.  First, an elucidation of the general 
problem is necessary.  As such Chapter One begins with an account of the impetus 
                                                 
21 Dicenso, 76-8. 
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behind Gadamer’s anti-objectivist alternative and the most explicit foundations for his 
interpretive pluralism.  This will then allow for a critical assessment of the effectiveness 
of such grounding, particularly as it relates to prejudices, which will be accompanied by a 
brief account of secondary and critical scholarship that, whether consciously or not, is 
founded on the ambiguous foundations of Gadamer’s interpretive pluralism.  With this 
Chapter Two presents Nāgārjuna’s arguments against svabhāva using śūnyatā and 
pratītyasamutpāda.  Specifically, Nāgārjuna’s argument against the svabhāva of causality 
is used as a sample of his metaphysics.  Following this is an account of the 
epistemological consequences of such a position.  In total, this provides the tools to 
firmly ground Gadamer’s interpretive pluralism. Chapter Three begins the process of 
clarifying Gadamer’s language and founding his overall system using these Buddhist 
concepts.  As such, Gadamer’s analysis of play comes closest to the Madhyamaka 
account of the interdependence and emptiness of the subject and object, consequently 
overcoming the division between the two and objectivism’s claim to any rebuttal.  This 
fuller explication of play then allows for the reintroduction of Gadamer’s prejudices and 
the reappraisal of the more central relationship between the interpreter and the 
traditionary text.    
11 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One 
The Problem:   
Gadamer’s Anti-Objectivism 
 
 As stated in the Introduction, before moving on to effectively grounding 
Gadamer’s interpretive pluralism it is crucial to understand the overall goals of his Truth 
and Method (though the theme is common in much of the rest of his work).22
Saving the Human Sciences (Geisteswissenschaft) 
  Only then 
is it possible to understand his critiques of objectivism and how he believes the system he 
develops in Truth and Method offers the more suitable alternative of interpretive 
pluralism.   
Though in its broadest conception Gadamer’s work questions the ultimate or ontological 
ground of human understanding generally, much of this, he believes, has already been 
addressed by Heidegger.  As such, Gadamer’s aim is more focused.  His question 
undoubtedly concerns the human sciences, their role, their form of truth and their means 
at arriving at such truth.23
                                                 
22 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363. 
  “Our question, by contrast [to Heidegger’s broader questions], 
is how hermeneutics, once freed from the ontological obstructions of the scientific 
 
23 Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxv-xxvi, 3; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. David 
Linge, trans. David Linge, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 18; Jean Grondin, 
Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 106; Ricoeur, 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 59-60; Charles Guignon, “Truth in Interpretation:  A Hermeneutics 
Approach,” in Is There a Single Right Interpretation?, ed. Michael Krausz (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 274. 
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concept of objectivity, can do justice to the historicity of understanding.”24  Though 
Gadamer’s primary concern may not be the critique of objectivism, as he believes 
Heidegger accomplished much of this initial task,25 his system does presuppose its 
untenability, and whether it is critique of Kant’s aesthetic consciousness or historicism, 
Gadamer is obliged to continually point out the negative role of objectivism in the human 
sciences and theories of understanding generally.26
According to Gadamer, whether in the form of psychologism, as exemplified in 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic theory,
 
27 or the historicism of Dilthey,28
The implicit presupposition of historical method, then, is that the permanent significance 
of something can first be known objectively only when it belongs to a closed context—in 
 the problem is 
essentially the same.  Both presuppose a single truth concerning an object, such as a text.  
Concerning texts, psychologism places the true meaning of the text in the psychology or 
intentionality of the author.  Historicism takes a slightly different route.  While the 
singular subjectivity of the author was the locus of the true meaning of the text for 
psychologism, historicism asserts that the meaning of a text was determined by the 
historical and cultural contexts in which it was created.  A step closer to Gadamer’s 
position, but this approach still clung to the ideals of natural scientific methodology.  As 
Gadamer points out: 
                                                 
24 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 268. 
 
25 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 245-254, esp. 254; Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Gadamer Reader:  A 
Bouquet of the Later Writings, ed. Richard Palmer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 
57. 
 
26 Gadamer, The Gadamer Reader, 61, 80. 
 
27 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 191.  Also see, Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, 67-
73. 
 
28 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 214.  See also, Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, 84-
92. 
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other words, when it is dead enough to have only historical interest.  Only then does it 
seem possible to exclude the subjective involvement of the observer.29
 
   
So it is clear that Gadamer’s critiques are aimed at the multifarious forms of 
objectivity that believe that there is a single truth about an object of interpretation that 
may be grasped once the cultural, historical and subjective contingencies of the 
interpreter are overcome.  Hence his concomitant critique of methodologies used for the 
purposes of expiating such contingencies.30  Such methodologies, he states, are based on 
a form of alienation (Verfremdung), one which falsely presupposes the separation of the 
subject from experience.  This is detrimental to the overall tasks of interpretation and 
understanding in so far as it may leave presuppositions unchecked and negate the being 
and purpose of experience.31
Historically Effected Consciousness 
 
So that is how Gadamer understands objectivism, as the attempt and the presupposition 
that it is possible for the interpreter or knower to remove personal and subjective 
contingencies in order to come to a single true understanding or knowledge of the 
phenomena in question.  How, then, does he counter it and propose his own alternative?  
His alternative to objectivism culminates with what he terms “historically effected 
consciousness” (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein).32
                                                 
29 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 297.  Cf. Ibid., 239, 240-1, and 293; and Gadamer, The Gadamer Reader, 
35, 80, and 114-5. 
  As Jean Grondin points out, 
 
30 For example see Gadamer, Truth and Method, 291. 
 
31 For example see, Ibid., 310 and 341-355, esp. 342.  See also, Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human 
Sciences, 60-1. 
 
32 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 301. 
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this term is slightly ambiguous.33  First, it may simply mean that consciousness is 
constituted by history or histories of effects.  For example, he states, “In relying on its 
critical method, historical objectivism conceals the fact that historical consciousness is 
itself situated in the web of historical effects.”34  But this term may also be prescriptive; 
that becoming aware of this fact, that we are historically constituted, is a hermeneutic 
task of its own, and one which is never complete:  “Consciousness of being affected by 
history (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein) is primarily consciousness of the 
hermeneutical situation.”35
 For Gadamer, the fact that we are so affected, to the point of being constituted, by 
history, forms the most damaging counter to objectivism.  As the above quotation states, 
being affected by history means we stand in a particular situation, which is composed of 
the very things we seek to interpret and understand.  Coming to know that situation and 
the cultural and historical elements that compose it is further complicated by the fact that 
we are always already in it:  “The very idea of a situation means that we are not standing 
outside it and hence are unable to have any objective knowledge of it.”
 While the latter meaning may be more concerned with the 
“method” of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, the former is more related to its 
“truth,” and is therefore more relevant for current purposes.   
36
                                                 
33 Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, 114. See also Gadamer's own appraisal, Gadamer, 
Truth and Method, xxx. 
   
 
34 Ibid., 300. Though Gadamer does not make this connection as explicitly as he should, how he 
understands wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein becomes clearer when seen through his understanding of 
Bildung; see Ibid., 8-17, esp. 13. 
 
35 Ibid., 301. 
 
36 Ibid. 
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This, however, speaks more to the interpreter’s situation or horizon generally.  An 
objectivist may grant this general difficulty without hesitation (though most likely not the 
a priori impossibility of overcoming it).  But what of individual objects of interpretation 
within this situation?  The real potency of his argument, and its major thrust, would then 
appear to be the prejudices (Vorurteile) created by and, as an aggregate, composing 
historically effected consciousness.  It is clear that by prejudice Gadamer does not intend 
its usual meaning; that is, a belief that is necessarily erroneous by virtue of the fact that it 
is methodologically or rationally unfounded.37
Obviously the value and importance of research cannot be measured by a criterion based 
in the subject matter [i.e. a prejudiceless objectivity].  Rather, the subject matter appears 
truly significant only when it is properly portrayed for us.  Thus we are certainly 
interested in the subject matter, but it acquires its life only from the light in which it is 
presented to us.
  Rather prejudices are born from the fact 
that we are always already in a situation, and that, when we encounter an object of 
interpretation, it is always an encounter with us in that situation.  For example, Gadamer 
states,  
38
 
   
Prejudices are this light.  They are then limiting predispositions that allow the interpreter 
to understand an object of interpretation from a set range of perspectives.39
                                                 
37 For example see, Gadamer, Truth and Method, 273; Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 9. 
 The question 
then becomes how do prejudices present a necessary alternative to objectivism, such that 
objectivism becomes untenable?  If Gadamer’s analysis of prejudices is correct, then 
there should be no room for objectivism or objectivist rejoinders.  To follow are two 
possible interpretations of how prejudices make objectivism untenable; though it should 
 
38 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 285. 
 
39 For an example of Gadamer's connecting of limitation, culture and play see Hans-Georg Gadamer, The 
Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, ed. Robert Bernasconi, trans. Nicholas Walker (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 124. 
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be noted that these two possibilities are really two sides of the same “prejudice” coin.  
They are only distinguished according to whether one begins with a positive or negative 
assessment of the role of prejudices in understanding; Gadamer appears to argue that 
prejudices simultaneously function positively and negatively for understanding. 40
Prejudices as Insurmountable Obstacles 
 
The first option is that prejudices are insurmountable obstacles.  There is some textual 
support for this reading.  For example,  
In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it.  Long before we understand 
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-
evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live.  The focus of subjectivity 
is a distorting mirror.  The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the 
closed circuits of historical life.  That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more 
than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.41
 
 
That is, as constituted by Bildung (culture or enculturation) we always already find 
ourselves inescapably, at least for the most part, in a pre-given situation that carries with 
it precommitments on how we do or possibly could interpret and understand the world 
and the elements within it.  If this is so, then it is impossible to always and completely 
foreground such precommitments in order to arrive at an understanding of an object of 
interpretation strictly governed by that object apart from subjective proclivities.   
Though, as previously stated, Gadamer’s primary aim may not be to deliver a 
decisive blow to objectivism, his overall system does exclude it as a viable position; 
however, the “prejudices as insurmountable” option does not adequately do so.  First, 
there is a possible objectivist response.  Even the most extreme proponents of objectivism 
                                                 
40 These two options are in large part borrowed from Weberman's account; in the end, however, his 
grounding of Gadamer's interpretive pluralism is just as vulnerable to objectivist critiques; Weberman, 46-
51.  For his proposed solution, see, Ibid., 54-7. 
 
41 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 278. 
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will generally agree that there are some obstacles created by the interpreter’s subjectivity.  
Even if they allow for the impossibility of overcoming them, objectivists may still argue 
that there is an ideal objective truth about the object towards which the interpreter may 
strive.42
 Second, taken by itself “prejudices as insurmountable” is a superficial reading of 
what Gadamer finds to be the most crucial characteristic of prejudices.  It is difficult to 
believe that anyone could give such a reading of Gadamer given the dual nature of 
prejudices.   In fact, E.D. Hirsch Jr. comes close to such a reading:   
  Here the ideal of objectivity and the objective truth of the object become the 
basis for criteria of validity and truth.  Such criteria would move dangerously close to an 
objective methodology, closer than Gadamer would want to allow. 
It will be my purpose in this final section to turn my critique of Gadamer’s book to good 
account by showing how the concept of Vorurteil has a significance far more positive 
than that given it in Wahrheit und Methode. I shall suggest…the methodological 
importance of the doctrine for conducting all forms of textual interpretation.43
  
  
As the explanation of option 2 to follow will demonstrate, Gadamer’s appraisal of 
prejudices is also and primarily quite positive.  The fact that Hirsch’s reading does have 
some textual support is only the first sign of the ambiguity surrounding Gadamer’s 
support for interpretive pluralism and his critiques of objectivism. 
Prejudices as Necessary Preconditions 
The second option offers a stronger exclusionary alternative to objectivism, though still 
inadequate, and appears to be the primary emphasis of Gadamer’s account of prejudices.  
Here prejudices are not simply insurmountable obstacles but necessary for any 
understanding at all.  Some of the above quotations have already hinted at this reading.  
                                                 
42 Weberman, 48. 
 
43 Hirsch, 258. 
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For sure, the first option does have some merit.  Gadamer does not believe all prejudices 
are good or legitimate, and he does deal with how illegitimate prejudices are fore-
grounded and tested.44
Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the 
truth.  In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of 
the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience.  Prejudices 
are biases of our openness to the world.  They are simply conditions whereby we 
experience something—whereby what we encounter says something to us. 
  But prejudices generally, according to Gadamer, are necessary for 
any access to or understanding of an object of interpretation:   
45
 
   
Here prejudices are not strictly undesirable though inevitable hindrances to 
understanding.  As essential to our always already being situated in a historical and 
cultural horizon, prejudices form the positive possibilities of accessing any object as an 
object of understanding and interpretation.  This is so insofar as prejudices are 
determined by the tradition from which they come and in which the interpreter exists.  As 
elements of the same tradition, objects of interpretation are formed by, inform, and share 
in these same prejudices, thus allowing the interpreter access to the object.46
 If this is true, this obviously represents a stronger critique of objectivism than the 
previous option.  However, as Weberman points out, even this has a possible objectivist 
  So, not only 
is it impossible to rid oneself of prejudices generally, it is undesirable to do so.   
                                                 
44 Most of Gadamer's accounts of foregrounding deal with confrontations with the text and the primarily, 
though not exclusively, negative nature of experience; see for example, Gadamer, Truth and Method, 270 
and 348-55.   
 
45 Gadamer, The Gadamer Reader, 82.  See also, Gadamer, Truth and Method, 278, 280; Gadamer, 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, 9. 
 
46 This, perhaps, deals only with prejudices as they relate to temporal (or historical) distance and its positive 
possibilities.  It does not address how what may be generally termed cultural distance may provide the 
possibility of understanding objects that do not belong to an historical tradition.  For a sign that Gadamer 
acknowledges distances other than temporal see, Gadamer, Truth and Method, 376 note 44.  For one 
possible argument for why Gadamer must acknowledge different distances see, Weberman, 54-7. 
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loop hole.47
Again, Hirsch’s reading is a convenient example of option 2 gone wrong.  
Perhaps in response to just this possibility, he distinguishes between meaning and 
significance.  Significance is the relevance a text or object has for the interpreter and her 
current cultural milieu.  Meaning is the objective truth, equivalent to the author’s original 
intent, of the object apart from such subjective contingencies.  “Meaning is that which is 
represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of a particular sign 
sequence…Significance, on the other hand, names a relationship between that meaning 
and a person…Failure to consider this simple and essential distinction has been the 
source of enormous confusion in hermeneutic theory.”
  It is quite possible that an objectivist will concede that at first there must be 
a common background that would allow for an initial, meaningful engagement with the 
object.  However, she could continue by arguing that this is only a useful first step.  Once 
complete, even this cultural or historical commonality must be tested and critiqued 
according to an objective methodology.   
48
                                                 
47 Weberman, 50. 
  While significance may be the 
impetus, or even the positive possibility, of research or interpretation, it is ultimately 
surmountable if one wishes to come to the true meaning of the object.  Again, it is 
obvious from Gadamer’s work that he does not want to leave such room for objectivists 
and their critiques.  To continue with Hirsch’s terminology, Gadamer would, at the very 
least, argue for a more codependent relation between meaning and significance.  But 
what position he takes on this continuum, the extremes of which are the two being nearly 
independent to being coextensive, is unclear.   
 
48 Hirsch, 8. 
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Manifestations of the Ambiguity 
As shown above, Gadamer believes that his alternative, namely interpretive pluralism, 
has left no ground for objectivism; however, objectivist rejoinders are legitimate.  So the 
ambiguity in fact lies between Gadamer’s conviction and whether he actually delivered 
on that conviction.  This is particularly evident in the secondary literature.  Though there 
are many areas of secondary literature where this ambiguity manifests, it is perhaps most 
visible in the debates concerning Gadamer’s stance on realism, particularly as it relates to 
his philosophy of language.  Therefore, a sample of this debate should be adequate to 
disclose the significance and byproducts of this ambiguity.49
First, then, is Brice Wachterhauser’s account of Gadamer’s “perspectival 
realism.”
 
50
                                                 
49 As a note, the following argument will use the term “anti-realism.”  Though it will be argued that this is a 
position that Gadamer should hold and one that Nāgārjuna does hold, it should be understood negatively 
rather than positively.  Essentially, it is just the rejection of realism, a metaphysical position often 
underlying epistemological objectivism.  In fact, just as Nāgārjuna rejects the realist/anti-realist dichotomy 
(in the positive sense), so too should Gadamer.  It should also be noted that this view is by no means 
universally attributed to Nāgārjuna.  For arguments presenting Nāgārjuna as an anti-realist see Jay 
Garfield’s commentary in Nāgārjuna, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way:  Nāgārjuna’s 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. Jay Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 103-23; and Jan 
Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2009), 207-8.  For arguments asserting Nāgārjuna’s attempt to transcend this dichotomy see Douglas 
Berger, “Acquiring Emptiness:  Interpreting Nāgārjuna’s MMK 24:18,” Philosophy East and West 60, no. 
1 (January 2010): 40-64; and Ewing Chinn, “Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda,” 
Philosophy East and West 51, no. 1 (January 2001): 54-72. 
  Wachterhauser notes the pluralism in Gadamer’s understanding of 
interpretation, and the inability of overcoming linguistic mediation and historical 
situatedness to come to a single understanding of an object.  However, according to 
Wachterhauser this does not negate the existence of this object apart from the various 
perspectives it may be viewed from.   
 
50 Wachterhauser, Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. Brice Wachterhauser, 1st ed. (Northwestern University 
Press, 1994), 154. 
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But although Gadamer says that we always understand the world in a language that is our 
own, it’s important to emphasize that what we understand is not simply our own world, 
but the world, the one world we all have in common.  Gadamer is an uncompromising 
realist…It’s only within this realist framework that we can begin to understand 
Gadamer’s much misunderstood remark that “being that can be understood is 
language.”51
 
  
From this and other such statements, it is clear that Wachterhauser is advancing the 
position that Gadamer asserts the existence of a one and true reality composed of objects 
independent of our individual or human apprehension of it.  The relation between the 
interpreter and the object of interpretation is then one in which the interpreter can never 
hope to gain full access to the object itself.  Wachterhauser acknowledges that “history 
and language are the two conditions of knowledge that Gadamer thinks make our 
knowing ‘finite.’”52  Essentially, this is the same interpretation found in option 1 given 
above, prejudices as insurmountable.  In addition, in his unique way and dealing 
specifically with language, Wachterhauser also acknowledges option 2, prejudices as the 
positive condition for any understanding at all.  On his reading, for Gadamer, language 
“’enhances’ or ‘increases’ the intelligibility of reality.”53
                                                 
51 Brice Wachterhauser, “Getting it Right:  Relativism, Realism and Truth,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Gadamer, ed. Robert Dostal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 66. 
  If Wachterhauser is correct, 
then Gadamer is vulnerable to just the type of objectivist critiques given above.  Again, 
even a congenial objectivist may reply that while our situatedness may make an ideal 
objective understanding impossible, it is possible to move closer to it.  If each perspective 
has a portion of the whole truth about an object, then quantity may in fact mean quality.  
Though there may be an infinite, or nearly so, number of partially true perspectives, the 
more one gains the more truth one has and the nearer one is to the objectivist ideal. 
 
52 Ibid., 57. 
 
53 Ibid., 67. 
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Perhaps Gadamer did in fact hold this position.  The point is that according to his overall 
system it is not always clear that he does nor, more importantly, whether he in fact 
should. 
Gianni Vattimo, however, offers a starkly contrasting interpretation of Gadamer’s 
“being that can be understood is language.” 
As far as Warheit und Methode is concerned, the good, correct, appropriate interpretation 
is never so in virtue of its correspondence to a previously set truth…On the contrary, one 
should rather say that things are what they truly are, only within the realms of 
interpretation and language.  In other words, a consistent formulation of hermeneutics 
requires a profound ontological revolution, because ontology must bid farewell to the 
idea of an objectified, external Being to which thought should strive to adequate itself.54
 
 
And addressing general interpretations similar to Wachterhauser’s, Vattimo warns that if 
such a reading were true then, “Gadamer would be limiting his doctrine to the domain of 
the human sciences, and he would imply a sort of objectivism and metaphysical 
realism.”55  While it is not clear whether or not Gadamer does endorse metaphysical 
realism, it should go without question that he abjures objectivism.  If objectivism and 
metaphysical realism are as closely linked as Vattimo asserts, one may question whether 
Gadamer should or even could endorse the latter.56
 At this point a short digression into Gadamer’ relation to metaphysics is in order.  
Defining metaphysics is obviously not simple.  Classic or “old” metaphysics generally 
 
                                                 
54 Gianni Vattimo, “Gadamer and the Problem of Ontology,” in Gadamer's Century:  Essays in Honor of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2002), 301. 
 
55 Ibid.  “Metaphysical realism” is simply the view that objects exist and exist with certain properties 
independent of “anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes and so on.”Alexander Miller, 
“Realism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/; Drew 
Khlentzos, “Semantic Challenges to Realism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-sem-challenge/. 
 
56 Vattimo appears to give Gadamer the benefit of the doubt believing that Gadamer could not have 
endorsed metaphysical realism because of this close connection to objectivism.  Vattimo,  302. 
 
23 
 
deals with questions of being, first causes, and immutable things, as well as positions that 
answer these questions negatively.57 Adding to the confusion post-Medieval or “new” 
metaphysics includes questions of modality, space, time, mereology, free will and so 
forth.58
How Gadamer understands metaphysics is as difficult to discern as the word 
itself, and is in large part the subject of the following argument.  Being a more or less 
“good” student of Heidegger, Gadamer’s metaphysical concerns in general deal with 
questions of being and time.  However, Gadamer is not an obsequious follower of 
Heidegger.  Gadamer does agree that being and understanding as events are constituted 
by time, thereby rejecting substance ontology.
  For the purposes of this argument, metaphysics is vaguely defined as questions 
and assertions concerning being(s) and ultimate existents.   
59 However, he was not as critical of 
metaphysics and its Western history as Heidegger.60  For Gadamer, metaphysics, 
particularly its Platonic forms, still has something to contribute, and that some form of 
metaphysics always underlies language.61
                                                 
57 Peter van Inwagen, “Metaphysics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/#ProMetNewMet. 
  Obviously, this does not satisfactorily answer 
what Gadamer’s metaphysics is, but this is what is at issue.  If this were not a point of 
 
58 Ibid.  As van Inwagen notes such issues were not overlooked by ancient and medieval philosophers, they 
were simply categorized differently.   
 
59 For example see, Gadamer, Truth and Method, 245-54, esp. 246, 248.  Also see David E. Linge, “Dilthey 
and Gadamer: Two Theories of Historical Understanding,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
41, no. 4 (December 1973): 549 and 551; Joel Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth 
and Method (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 256. 
 
60 For example see Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Krell (New York: Harper Perennial 
Modern Classics, 2008), 115-138, esp. 137-8.; Brice Wachterhauser, Beyond Being: Gadamer's Post-
Platonic Hermeneutic Ontology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999), 36-7; Robert Dostal, 
“Gadamer: The Man and His Work,” in The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, ed. Robert Dostal (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 30. 
 
61 Wachterhauser, Beyond Being, 11, 13, and 36-7; Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics, 249-50. 
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contention then the answer that the following argument is intended to be would have no 
question, and the secondary scholarship would not be as divided.   
 With this, Gadamer’s ambiguity, between his epistemology and metaphysics, 
once more becomes apparent.  Again, he unambiguously critiques objectivism’s assertion 
that it is possible to come to a single true understanding of an object of interpretation.  
And in its strongest and clearest terms this seems to be due to the necessity of prejudices 
for there to be any encounter at all between the interpreter and the object.  But it has been 
shown how objectivists may circumvent this option.  While something like perspectival 
(or multiplist) realism allows for pluralism (and attempts to overcome relativism or 
interpretive nihilism), it does not allow for the strong critiques Gadamer makes of 
objectivism.  So the question again is, is there a foundation that will both guard against 
objectivist rejoinders and cohere with Gadamer’s overall system?  The answer is yes and 
is the subject of the next chapter.  Ultimately, the goal is to provide a new firm anti-
objectivist metaphysics for Gadamer’s interpretive pluralism, which is the subject of 
Chapter Three.  Before doing so, however, the coming chapter gives a comparatively 
brief summation of Nāgārjuna and his metaphysical argument against svabhāva, along 
with its epistemological consequences.  This provides the material for the new 
foundation.  
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Chapter Two 
Nāgārjuna: Emptiness and Interdependence 
As the last chapter demonstrated, the fact that Gadamer rejects objectivist epistemology 
while offering interpretive pluralism as an exclusionary alternative is clear.  The ultimate 
metaphysical ground of these assertions, however, is not.  The specific source of this 
ambiguity, as the above section on the secondary literature shows, is ultimately 
Gadamer’s metaphysics and its relation to his epistemology.  It is the goal of this chapter 
to set the foundation for correcting this problem.  As one might expect from the 
Introduction Nāgārjuna and his arguments against svabhāva supply the means to this 
goal.  As such, Nāgārjuna’s arguments concerning the metaphysics of causality will be 
used as a sample case for how śūnyatā, pratītyasamutpāda, and svabhāva function.  
Although Nāgārjuna provides an abundance of arguments from which to choose, this 
particular argument is, arguably, the strongest and has the broadest application.  
Following this will be the epistemological arguments and consequences entailed by such 
a view.  
 Before continuing to Nāgārjuna’s specific arguments a few general notes are 
necessary.  First, aside from the general positive possibilities for bringing Gadamer and 
Nāgārjuna into dialogue, there is a more specific similarity that makes this endeavor 
possible.  As stated in the Introduction, both operate in systems, or at least attempt to do 
so, that aim to overcome the subject/object divide.  Though quotes and citations given 
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above from Gadamer should be sufficient to demonstrate at least his attempt to do so, for 
the sake of reinforcement one more may be added:  “Our line of thought prevents us from 
dividing the hermeneutic problem in terms of the subjectivity of the interpreter and the 
objectivity of the meaning to be understood.  This would be starting from a false 
antithesis that cannot be resolved even by recognizing the dialectic of subjective and 
objective.”62
Someone is disclosed by something. 
  Gadamer’s point is stronger than it may at first appear.  Overcoming the 
division between the subjective and the objective must move beyond a dialectic where 
the two exist independently yet influence one another, a point Nāgārjuna would agree 
with.  As for Nāgārjuna, the following verse should also be sufficient for introductory 
purposes. 
Something is disclosed by someone. 
How could there be someone without something, 
And something without someone? (MMK 9:5)63
 
 
In fact, Nāgārjuna’s success with arguments against this dichotomy is what makes him of 
particular use in disambiguating, if not Gadamer’s actual position then at least the one he 
should have chosen given his general aims.   
 Second, one must note the argumentative consequence of asserting universal 
emptiness.  There, in fact, is no master or meta argument for śūnyatā in Nāgārjuna’s 
work.  With the fall of objective existence comes the fall of general methodology.  Rather 
individual arguments must be found and applied according to the particular phenomena 
                                                 
62 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 309. 
 
63 For similar assertions concerning the interpretation of this verse and Nāgārjuna’s general attempts to 
overcome the subject/object dichotomy see Nāgārjuna, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, 184; 
Tsong Khapa, Ocean of Reasoning:  A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. 
Jay Garfield and Geshe Ngawang Samten (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 26 and 239; 
Alfonso Verdu, The Philosophy of Buddhism: A "Totalistic" Synthesis, 1st ed. (Hague: Martinus Nihoff 
Publishers, 1981), 104-5.   
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under investigation.64
Third and finally, a brief word on svabhāva and what it means to have it.  
Literally, it may be rendered “own-being,” “self-existence,” “self-nature,” and so forth.  
The primary requirement to have svabhāva is independence, specifically being causally, 
mereologically, and conceptually independent.
  With this in mind the first argument for śūnyatā to follow should 
be taken as a case example of how śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda entail a lack of 
svabhāva; the minutia of the argument and some of its larger structural elements may 
only applicable to this particular class of phenomena. 
65  There is some difficulty in finding an 
exact match in Western philosophy.  For example, haecceity or quiddity would not 
always be equivalent.  Take the classic Buddhist example of fire and heat.  Heat is the 
svabhāva of fire.  This may be shared by all instances of fire, and may even be shared by 
such antitheses as water.  The difference here is that fire has heat necessarily, while water 
obtains it through depends on sources of heat.  Yet, in discussions of identity and 
difference svabhāva does appear to carry the above connotations.66  Yet there is also a 
history, to which Nāgārjuna replies that strongly suggest that svabhāva should be 
understood as substance.   Take, for example, the Abhidharmic attempt to circumvent 
substantialism using property-particulars.67
                                                 
64 Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka, 16-17, and 92; Nāgārjuna, The Dispeller of Disputes: 
Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyavartani, trans. Jan Westerhoff (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 94. 
  Though both “substance” and “essence” have 
their merits as translations, neither completely fills the position. For no other reason than 
 
65For example, see MMK 15:1-8; Jan Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 27, 32-41; Khapa, 317-22. 
 
66  Khapa, 119; Verdu, 109. 
 
67 Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2007), 113-19; Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka, 32-6; Verdu, 94-7. 
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what seems to be convention, when svabhāva is translated, it will be translated as 
essence. The important point is that to have svabhāva is to have some quality or nature 
that may not be altered without the object becoming something else.  As such, despite 
interrelation or change the svabhāva remains the same.  
The ultimate goal of such arguments is to demonstrate not that nothing exists, but 
that what does exist is interdependent, particularly on the human subject.  This has the 
consequence of not only dispelling notions of an metaphysically objective reality to 
which human understanding must comport, but also of dispelling the counter-notion that 
what is taken as “real” or “true” is simply subjective and relative.  For Gadamer, the 
former will mean that there is no object apart from the subject to which truth must 
correspond.  It will not simply be, as with Kant, that reason cannot get to this object as it 
is apart from the subject, for there is no “in-itself,” but rather the object does not exist 
without the subject.  The latter, i.e. the overcoming of subjectivism, is dealt with briefly 
in the Conclusion, and is what demonstrates how Gadamer is able to reject objectivism 
while not falling into an “anything goes” approach. 
The Emptiness of Causality 
Despite the above disclaimer stating that the following argument concerning causation 
should not be taken as a universal argument for śūnyatā, it is nevertheless a central and, 
for present purposes, appropriate example.  Causality is one of the fundamental human 
categories for the interpretation of phenomena and reality.  As such, demonstrating the 
śūnyatā of causality has general metaphysical ramifications, even if not all of the details 
of the argument are universally applicable.  Further and as alluded to above, it will have 
more specific consequences for epistemology.   
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 I will begin, then, with Nāgārjuna’s argument specifically dealing with agent and 
action in Chapter VIII of the MMK. 
This existent agent 
Does not perform an existent action. 
Nor does some nonexistent agent 
Perform some nonexistent action (MMK 8:1). 
 
Here Nāgārjuna presents the conclusion of the argument to follow.  Madhyamaka, as the 
middle path, attempts to navigate between the extremes of substantialism, represented by 
the first two lines, and nihilism corresponding to the second two lines.  The reader may 
recall that Gadamer, following Heidegger, rejects substance ontology and the 
corresponding belief that the object presents itself in a self-evident way to the subject in 
favor of the assertion that it is only within pre-given interpretive frameworks (modes of 
being or tradition) that the object is allowed to disclose itself.  Nāgārjuna will agree; 
however, as the argument continues Nāgārjuna will go further to say that there is 
“nothing” outside of these interpretive frameworks and that those frameworks that 
suppose otherwise fall into an inevitable contradiction. 
An existent entity has no activity. 
There would also be action without an agent. 
An existent entity has no activity. 
There would also be agent without action (MMK 8:2).   
  
As is usually the case with Nāgārjuna’s efficient use of language, the above verse 
assumes some background knowledge on the part of the reader.  This verse represents a 
reply to an assumed opposition.   Here, the opponent’s assertion is that the agent has 
svabhāva.  Again, having svabhāva entails a lack of change or alteration of the 
phenomena’s essential nature.  This also entails that there cannot be alternation or change 
in svabhāva; if this were so, then that particular phenomena would cease to be that 
phenomena.  This is the point of “An existent entity has no activity.”  Activity necessary 
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for action on the part of the agent necessarily entails change, more specifically change 
that is dependent on action.68
 Of course, the assertion that activity entails change on the part of the agent’s 
essence may seem odd.  Could there not be independent existent things and change?  
Take a simplified version of atomic theory for example.  According to this theory 
physical reality is composed of unchanging substances, and what change is perceived is 
the rearrangement of these basic physical constituents.
  Therefore, to maintain the essence of the agent, that 
essence must be independent of the action.  This would make it possible for there to be an 
action without an agent.   
69
 This on its own may still be unconvincing particularly for those that hold a 
substance/property ontology.  Here change would be change in the properties that adhere 
to a substance rather than in the substance itself.  Though Nāgārjuna has a novel reply to 
  So, a bicycle as an aggregate of 
atoms may not have independent existence, but the individual atoms composing the 
bicycle do.  Why would svabhāva be ultimately incompatible with this view?  The 
answer is a familiar problem in the philosophy of science and epistemology.  The curious 
consequence of such aggregationist explanations is that they become further and further 
removed from the empirical realm, and become ever more theoretical to the point where 
contemporary physics is even unable to empirically test such explanations.  Remember 
that one requirement for objectivism and independent existence is independence from a 
cognizing subject.  As explanations come to this hyper-theoretical point, they become 
ever more, even completely, reliant on cognizing subjects. 
                                                 
68 For another account of Nāgārjuna’s refutation of svabhāva using change see MMK 13. 
 
69 This is, in fact, the Nyāya response; see Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, 109-110. 
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this position, particularly in his analysis of motion (MMK 2), it is not of current 
relevance, particularly since Gadamer has already rejected this position. 
Nāgārjuna’s agent/action argument then continues: 
If a nonexistent agent 
Were to perform a nonexistent action, 
Then the action would be without a cause 
And the agent would be without a cause (MMK 8:3). 
 
The first consequence of this verse is obvious and, ostensibly, uncontroversial; with 
neither an agent nor an action there is no cause for the action.  It also serves as a warning 
against the nihilistic interpretation of emptiness, a consequence that will become more 
important when the general metaphysical consequences of śūnyatā are delineated later 
and when such consequences are applied to Gadamer’s interpretive pluralism.   
The next consequence of the verse is more controversial and requires a more 
robust defense.  Without an action there is no agent.  The first connotation of this 
statement is fairly uncontroversial.  If there is nothing that is labeled as “action,” then 
there is nothing deserving the label “agent.”  So, a carpenter may be labeled as agent of 
the action “building a table.” If there is no building of the table, then the carpenter could 
not be the agent of that action.  However, this does not mean that the carpenter is 
essentially altered by this.  This would be fairly unimpressive if this were all that 
Nāgārjuna meant.   
The stronger interpretation is that the carpenter is essentially different depending 
on whether or not the building of the table occurs.  Here dependence is existential.  Jan 
Westerhoff defines existential dependence as such:  “[an] object x is essentially F, and if 
it also depends notionally on some y being G, then x will also depend existentially on y’s 
being G, since x has to have F to exist at all (this is just what F being an essential 
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property of x means.”70
Unfortunately for the hypothetical opponent this only weakens the argument.  
Nāgārjuna has already anticipated this argument, in fact presupposes it, in MMK 1:1-14.   
Conditions such as water, lighting, soil, the seed and so forth constitute the conditions of 
the causal field, all of which are necessary for the production of the tree.  But what allows 
one to attribute causal efficacy to these conditions for the creation of a tree?  Put 
differently, by what fact are these conditions, and not others, grouped together, and yet 
not all of the time?  Causal efficacy cannot simply be attributed to the seed, water and so 
forth individually; nor is it enough that they all exist.  The tree is this factor; without the 
tree there would be no reason to group together these conditions and label them as 
“cause.”  This will become particularly important when reanalyzing Gadamer’s “play” 
and its metaphysical consequences.  For Nāgārjuna pratītyasamutpāda is the process by 
which all phenomena arise.  In Gadamer’s analysis of art and aesthetics, play is the 
process by which the work of art arises.  The problem, however, which is given greater 
attention in Chapter Three, is whether or not the elements in play have objective 
  For example, take a seed to be x and a tree to be y.  Here the tree 
(y) has the essential property (G) of being caused by the seed (x).  This seems fairly 
uncontroversial, but this still leaves the controversial assertion that the seed (x) has the 
essential property (F) of having caused, or having the power to cause, the tree.  If this 
were not the case, then the necessity of causality itself would be undermined.  One would 
then not be able to reliably predict the effect given the presence of its cause.  The usual 
reply would be that causality itself accounts for such inefficacy.  Improper watering, soil 
conditions, and so forth may all account for the inability of the seed to cause the tree.   
                                                 
70 Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka, 28. 
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existence.  Nāgārjuna’s obvious answer is no, and is what will aid Gadamer’s position 
against objectivism. 
 So, from the above arguments it is obvious that effect is dependent on the cause, 
and, contrary to convention, the cause or causal conditions are dependent on the effect.  
This interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda) entails their lack of svabhāva.  A word of 
caution is needed, however.  Despite what may be the reader’s “instinctual” reaction 
when seeing the words “empty” or “emptiness,” it does not entail non-existence.  It 
should be obvious to anyone with the slightest exposure to Nāgārjuna’s work that this is 
not his intended conclusion.  One need only look to the opening verse of the MMK and 
keep in mind the literal meaning of “Madhyamaka,” the Middle Way, to realize this.  
Nāgārjuna’s intention is to navigate between eternalism/reification and nihilism.  
“Things” do exist, from the tree to its leaves and roots.  Though under analysis these 
things breakdown into dependence relations.  For instance, the tree depends 
mereologically on its leaves, branches and roots; it depends causally on the seed, water, 
sun and soil; and as will become vital shortly, it depends cognitively on the subject.  It is 
the subject that distinguishes between the seed and the tree and unifies the leaves, 
branches and roots into the tree. 
Nāgārjuna’s Epistemology 
The conclusion of the last section requires some elucidation, particularly given its vital 
role in correcting Gadamer.  As one may expect, Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics has its 
epistemological counterpart.  As such, the following argument concerns the relation 
between the knower, the means of knowledge (pramāṇ a), and the objects of knowledge 
(prameya).  As one may expect, the general conclusion of the argument will be that all 
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three are mutually interdependent and may be characterized only in relation to the others.  
As such, they are empty, though again not in the sense of ineffectiveness or non-
existence.  Ultimately, it should become apparent that Gadamer and Nāgārjuna’s 
epistemology share much in common.  If this is correct, then it should be appropriate to 
adapt Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics to Gadamer.   
 The first argument, then, concerns the dependent relation between the knower and 
the means to knowledge, specifically sight, though the argument is intended to be 
exhaustively applicable to all means of knowledge.71
That very seeing does not see 
  As before, Nāgārjuna is replying to 
an opponent advocating for svabhāva.   
Itself at all. 
How can something that cannot see itself 
See another? (MMK 3:2) 
 
Though somewhat obscure, this verse is meant as an initial and quick refutation of sight 
having svabhāva.  The opponent assumes that sight, or any other means to knowledge, 
has an independent existence.  This would require it to have an essence or nature, which 
being the faculty of sight would be seeing.  However, if it had independent existence it 
would not require either a subject (seer) or an object (seen).  But what then would this 
floating seeing see?  It is only left with itself, meaning that there could be visual 
apperception, which is not possible.  So, seeing cannot be the essence of sight. 
 Most, including Gadamer, would not argue with faculties or means of knowledge 
being dependent on something; this something generally being the subject.  However, 
                                                 
71 According to traditional Buddhist epistemology, particularly Nyāya, there are four, perception, inference, 
testimony, and likeness; see Nāgārjuna, The Dispeller of Disputes, 67. 
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Nāgārjuna is quick to point out that the subject qua seer also does not exist 
independently.   
Without detachment from vision there is no seer. 
Nor is there a seer detached from it. 
If there is no seer 
How can there be seeing or the seen? (MMK 3:6) 
 
Here, the first line asserts that seer and seeing cannot be identical; this follows from the 
previous argument.  Nor are the seer and seeing essentially different; though this follows 
from the above argument for the interdependence of agent and action, it also follows 
from the immediately preceding verses.  To say that seer and seeing are essentially 
different allows for the action of seeing to take place without a subject or agent of seeing.  
Nāgārjuna points out the obvious consequences; if there is no seer there could be no 
seeing or seen. 
 Again, the interdependence of seer and seeing may not be controversial; what is 
not as conventionally obvious is the interdependence of seeing and seen.  With this the 
question concerns how the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge are 
established.  Here “establish” may simply mean to discover and determine the properties 
of something.  So as an analogy, if one wishes to establish the dimensions of a box, one 
may simply use a ruler or measuring tape.72  More fundamentally, to establish means to 
justify; so the question, “How does one justify the reliability of the means to knowledge,” 
is implied in the following argument.73
                                                 
72  Nāgārjuna, The Dispeller of Disputes, 30. 
   The conventional understanding would be that 
the means of knowledge establish, as in obtain information about, the objects of 
knowledge, and that the means are then in turn somehow justified in their ability and 
 
73 See for example, Ibid., 31. 
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reliability to do so.  But, as one may guess, Nāgārjuna’s argument will demonstrate that 
the means and objects of knowledge are mutually established, interdependent, and, 
therefore, empty. 
 If one affirms that means of knowledge establish objects of knowledge, one also 
has to account for how the means are established; how does one know the properties of 
the means that allow for such information and how are they justified?  There are two 
premises that must be kept in mind:  (1) “means of knowledge” is meant as an 
encompassing term for all the ways we have access to the world and (2) these means also 
exist in the world; that is, they may also become objects of knowledge.74
 One possible response is that any specific means of knowledge is established by 
one or more other means of knowledge.  So perception may be established by inference 
and testimony.   Though Nāgārjuna does not explicitly deal with this option one may 
infer a possible response.  I hear a load noise and judge that it is a thunder clap.  What 
justifies my auditory perception in supposing this rather than a car backfire, hallucination, 
or what have you?  First, I may have the testimony of the weatherperson telling me that 
thunder storms would be coming through my area.  I also receive other perceptual cues, 
such as rain, dark clouds, and so forth. Through memory I know that when these 
perceptual cues occur together there is often thunder.  Altogether these may be used to 
justify my perception of thunder.  In turn, this may also justify my other means; I have 
evidence to support the weatherperson’s testimony and my visual perception.  This does 
in fact seem to be our usual engagement with the world, but are any of these means 
thereby established?  Here, one may argue that the means are established by mutual 
 
                                                 
74  Nāgārjuna, The Dispeller of Disputes, 69-70. 
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coherence, what may be a more polite term for circularity.75  Remember, however, that 
according to a substantialist or objectivist view, the means of knowledge are meant to 
establish independently existing things (things with svabhāva).  Coherentism cannot give 
us an account of how this occurs or whether it in fact does occur.76
 The second possible response is a variation on the first.  Rather than the means to 
knowledge being established by the other recognized means to knowledge, there is an 
additional means to knowledge with the property of being able to reliably represent the 
world.
  Though in the first 
few steps of justification and establishment perception is justified by other means to 
knowledge, ultimately those means become dependent on perception for their 
establishment.  The objects themselves never enter in, and therefore how or whether the 
means establish the objects is not given.  So, the means as established by other means is 
not a viable option. 
77
 The next option is that the means of knowledge do not require establishment or 
are inherently established.  Remember, however, that according to the objectivist position 
the means to knowledge are our access to the world and exist in the world.  So, if the 
  But how is this means established and justified?  It would seem to require 
another means, leading to an infinite regress.  In general, such regresses should be 
avoided; here specifically one never gets the grounding that the means are supposed to 
supply. 
                                                 
75 For an account of how coherentism may not necessarily lead to circularity see, Laurence Bonjour, “The 
Structure of Empirical Knowledge,” in Epistemology:  Contemporary Readings (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 390-2. However, the present argument does not turn on whether or not coherentism is circular. 
 
76 For another account of the failings of this type of epistemology see William P. Alston, Perceiving God: 
The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 73. 
 
77  Nāgārjuna, The Dispeller of Disputes, 30. 
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means to knowledge do not require establishment, then there is something in the world 
that does not require establishment.78  If the means exist in the world and yet do not 
require establishment, then conceivably there are other objects in the world that do not 
require establishment.  If one holds this position, one cannot simply presuppose that 
objects of knowledge require establishment.  One would then need to justify why objects 
of knowledge require establishment.  Of course, one may reply that in establishing the 
objects, the means simultaneously establish themselves.  Aside from other various retorts, 
this returns the objectivist to the above problem of “sight seeing itself.”79  There is also 
the problem that if the means were self-established, then they would be independent of 
the objects of knowledge, returning to the above problem of the independent nature of 
cause and effect.  However, means to knowledge are means to knowledge of something.  
For example, visual perception corresponds to certain qualia such as color.80
 This then exhausts the ways in which the means may be established by other 
means or by themselves.  Means as somehow established by their objects then seems to 
be the only option left.  Though Nāgārjuna will also reject this option, one must 
remember that his rejection is contingent on the opponent’s assertion that though the 
objects may establish the means both still exist with svabhāva.   
 If the means 
to knowledge were truly independent, then it would be difficult to justify what they are 
means to knowledge of, if anything. 
                                                 
78  Nāgārjuna, The Dispeller of Disputes, 31. 
 
79 For other responses Nāgārjuna gives see Nāgārjuna, The Dispeller of Disputes, 31-2; Nāgārjuna, The 
Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, 28-30. 
 
80 For a contemporary Western account of the relation between "inputs" and means to knowledge or 
"doxastic practices" see Alston, 153-5. 
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 The objectivist may grant that the means are established by their objects.  Behind 
this, again, is the assumption that such objects exist with svabhāva; so they are in some 
sense prior to the means of knowledge.  Unfortunately, to arrive at this one must first use 
knowledge of the objects obtained through the means of knowledge in order to establish 
what counts as a particular means of knowledge.  To do this would require the means of 
knowledge and their previous establishment, making their establishment through their 
objects unnecessary.81  Of course, one could give the absurd reply that the objects of 
knowledge are somehow established without the benefit of any means of knowledge.  
From this it would seem then that one has direct access to the objects of knowledge, 
thereby making the means themselves unnecessary.82
 Nāgārjuna moves the argument closer to his conclusion when he points out that if 
the means of knowledge are established by their objects the relation is then reversed.
 
83  If 
the point of means to knowledge is to do the establishing and the objects of knowledge 
function to establish the means, then the objects in fact become the means of knowledge 
and the means of knowledge become the objects.  The objectivist may, in fact, have no 
problem with this.  The point, however, is that this is another instance of circularity with 
no grounding and therefore no means to get to the svabhāva of either the means or their 
objects.84
                                                 
81  Nāgārjuna, The Dispeller of Disputes, 33. 
  It is not that Nāgārjuna finds circularity in general untenable, in fact, it fits 
well with his assertions of emptiness and interdependence; his point, rather, is that his 
 
82 Ibid. 
 
83 Ibid., 33-4. 
 
84 Ibid., 34. 
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opponents would find circularity untenable and that circularity and svabhāva cannot co-
exist. 
 The point of all these objections to the various options is to demonstrate that an 
object is not an object of knowledge intrinsically (through svabhāva) nor are means 
means to knowledge intrinsically.  Visual perception is only a means to knowledge in 
virtue of having something to see; reciprocally an object is only an object of knowledge 
according to the ways in which it interacts with various means of knowledge.  Further, 
the object as we understand it, is composed of the artificial cognitive assemblage of 
information gained through the various means of knowledge.  So, objects as objects and 
means as means are determined by the context in which the investigation occurs.   
One may also take this argument beyond the mutual dependence relation between 
the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge.  As the above arguments have 
shown, there is also a mutual dependence between the knower and the means to 
knowledge.  So, if x is dependent on y and y is dependent on z, then x must also be 
dependent on z.  There is then a reciprocal dependence between the knower and the 
objects of knowledge. 
There are then roughly two general consequences to this epistemology.  First, the 
existence of objects of knowledge allows one to divide methods or sources of knowledge 
and label them as means to knowledge.  If some method did not provide access to objects 
of knowledge they would not be justifiably considered means of knowledge; in fact, they 
most likely would not be recognized at all.85
                                                 
85 One example of this would be Alston's attempt to establish a "new" means to knowledge or doxastic 
practice, Christian mystical perception, based on its correspondence with, and ability to grant access to an 
aspect of reality, God, not generally covered by other means; Alston, Perceiving God. 
   Second, at the same time and as already 
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stated, the means of knowledge create the objects of knowledge by aggregating the 
various forms of information.  For example, what one understands as a particular chair is 
a confluence of color, shape, spatio-temporal location, texture, and so forth gathered and 
combined through perception.  This would be a more conventional account, but one could 
include other means as well.  If one doubts whether something were a chair, then the 
testimony of a carpenter may clear up the matter.  Or through socialization, another form 
of testimony, one comes to know the general “family traits” of a chair.  This then allows 
one to store in memory examples of chairs with which to judge future cases of possible 
chairs.  
An immediate point of comparison and similarity between Gadamer and 
Nāgārjuna may be made here. Gadamer argues for the dependence of the object of 
interpretation on the particular mode of investigation.  He states, for example, “The 
theme and object of research are actually constituted by the motivation of the inquiry.  
Hence historical research is carried along by the historical movement of life itself and 
cannot be understood teleologically in terms of the object into which it is inquiring.  Such 
an ‘object in itself’ clearly does not exist at all.”86
                                                 
86 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 285. 
 For Gadamer, then, the prejudices of 
an interpreter as a historian, exegete, sociologist and so forth in part construct the object 
of interpretation.  Nāgārjuna is arguing essentially for the same thing, though he in fact 
begins with perhaps the most taken-for-granted relation between subject and object, 
perception.  Once perception, as our most basic engagement with the world, is shown to 
be based on interdependence of the perceiver, perception and the perceived, then the 
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contextual dependency of the object of interpretation on the mode of investigation 
because an easy and perhaps inevitable step.   
General Consequences 
According to Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics everything is interdependent; what some “thing” 
is is dependent on the relations it has.  As such there is no immutable substance 
underlying phenomena.  Obviously this is in direct opposition to objectivism; if there is 
no stable substance, essence, or nature to an object, then there is no stable truth of that 
object.  The scope of this position will become more apparent in the next chapter when it 
is used to correct and rebuild Gadamer’s system.  Also, as detailed above this position 
has a concomitant effect in epistemology.  Part of the context of relations an object has, 
particularly as an object of knowledge, is its relationship with the knower, which also 
happens to be determined by contextual relations of which the objects is apart.  One’s 
knowledge, or understanding, of an object would then be equally unstable.  In matters of 
interpretation and understanding this, as will be the topic of the coming chapter, gives a 
firm grounding to Gadamer’s interpretive pluralism.  
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Chapter Three 
The New Foundation for Gadamer’s Interpretive Pluralism 
As Chapter One demonstrated Gadamer’s system requires a rejection of objectivism, but 
the exact grounds for and strength of that rejection in favor of interpretive pluralism is 
ambiguous.  The most likely and apparent candidates for Gadamer’s rejection of 
objectivism, historically effected consciousness and prejudices, whether as positive 
possibilities for or the limit of understanding, are not enough, at least unless they are 
coupled with an objectivist-proof metaphysics.  Otherwise this would leave open the 
possibility for objectivist rejoinders.  Chapter Two presented metaphysical and 
epistemological arguments advanced by Nāgārjuna that would make such rejoinders 
impossible.  Metaphysically there are no independent objects with an essence or 
underlying substance to stabilize truth and meaning of those objects.  Rather objects as 
objects and subjects as subjects are determined or arise according to their relative 
positions in a network of relations.  Epistemologically, then, objects of understanding or 
knowledge do not have an independent existence (svabhāva), but are rather constituted or 
determined by the context in which they occur, the most important relation in this context 
being the relation between knower and known or interpreter and interpreted.  The goal of 
the present chapter is then to synthesize these two systems in such a way as to leave 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, particularly its epistemology, largely intact while 
giving it the firm anti-objectivist base provided by Nāgārjuna.  In fact, the clearest point 
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of connection between these two systems occurs with Gadamer’s analysis of play.  It is 
here that Gadamer comes closest to a Madhyamaka metaphysics as presented in Chapter 
Two.  With some slight amending and elucidation it should then be possible to give 
Gadamer a firmly anti-objectivist metaphysics based on play.  
The Metaphysics of Play  
Gadamer first introduces play as a means to analyze aesthetics and art, though its 
significance is much broader as will be seen shortly.87  Play, according to Gadamer, is the 
mode of being of art:  “When we speak of play in reference to the experience of art, this 
means neither the orientation nor even the state of mind of the creator or of those 
enjoying the work of art, nor the freedom of a subjectivity engaged in play, but the mode 
of being of the work of art itself.”88
Gadamer intends play to explain what occurs between the spectator, which may 
include the museum patron, the audience of a drama, the artist herself, and so forth, and 
the art “object.”  The point here is to overcome previous aesthetic theories, such as 
Kant’s, that presuppose that the nature of art exists either in the object or in the 
subjectivity of the spectator.
   
89  For example, “The ‘subject’ of the experience of art, that 
which remains and endures, is not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it but 
the work itself.”90
                                                 
87 See Gadamer's own later appraisal, Gadamer, The Gadamer Reader, 115. 
 Here, subjectivity is removed, but one may point to the conclusion of 
the quotation, “the work itself,” and argue that Gadamer is placing art in the object, 
 
88 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 102. 
 
89 See for example Gadamer, Truth and Method, 77-87; Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 18-21. 
 
90 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 103. 
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whether it is the sculpture, the painting, or what have you.  Here the truth of the art would 
lie in the object itself, i.e. objectivism.  For reasons provided in Chapter One, this 
position is untenable given Gadamer’s larger goals.91  With this there would be one truth, 
rather than a plurality of truths, concerning the work of art.  This position also 
misunderstands what “the work itself” is for Gadamer.92
First, play is a process.
  Since the being of the work 
itself is play, play must be further elucidated in order to clarify what the “work of art” is 
for Gadamer. 
93 More importantly it is a to and fro medial process that 
takes place in-between.94  From this medial nature of play Gadamer argues for the 
irrelevance of the subjectivities of the individual players to play itself.  “For play has its 
essence independent of the consciousness of those who play.”95 As a supporting example 
he notes that there can be a play of colors, which does not mean that it is one color versus 
another but that play in this instance is a processual changing of colors.96
                                                 
91 In an effort to help avoid confusion on the part of the reader, the terms “object” and “work” are given 
fairly specific meanings in the following analysis.  “Object,” in phrases such as “art object” or “object of 
art,” refers to the thing that is commonly attributed as art, such as the sculpture, painting or poem 
themselves; where as “work” refers to the phenomena of art itself.  The purpose of much of the analysis to 
follow is to disambiguate the two, demonstrate that for Gadamer there is a difference, and elucidate the 
significance of this difference. 
  The art object, 
 
92 Gadamer later implicitly acknowledges the ambiguity of this phrase when he advances Gebilde, creation 
or construction, as a preferable alternative, Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 126.   
 
93 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 104, 107, and 109. 
 
94 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 104 and 109. 
 
95 Ibid., 103.  Though this will be taken up later, this does not mean that players generally are irrelevant to 
play.  For Gadamer, there is a difference between the players and the subjectivities of the players.  
Endorsing the latter would move Gadamer too close to previous aesthetic theories that advocate that art is 
located within the spectator. 
 
96 Ibid., 104. 
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in distinction to the work itself, such as the painting or sculpture, then becomes another 
player in the play of art.97
 One clue to this fact is Gadamer’s insistence that presentation is essential to the 
work of art, for it “only manifests and displays itself when it is constituted in the 
viewer.”
   
98
The work of art cannot simply be isolated from the “contingency” of the chance 
conditions in which it appears, and where this kind of isolation occurs, the result is an 
abstraction that reduces the actual being of the work.  It itself belongs to the world to 
which it represents itself.  A drama really exists only when it is played, and ultimately 
music must resound.
  The script of the drama, the score of the music, or the paint of the painting do 
not become works of art unless their modes of presentation are fulfilled.  The work must 
be seen, heard, and so forth.   
99
 
 
Gadamer’s analysis of drama is a useful example here.  Where does the art or play of 
drama lie?  It cannot simply lie in the single subject, nor can it lie in any intersubjective 
agreement between the subjectivities of the spectators, i.e. the audience.100
So with the use of play as the essence or being of art, Gadamer argues that art exists 
neither in the subject (spectator, artist, and so forth) nor in the object(s).  Rather the work 
of art exists in the dependent relation between the two; the drama arises at the confluence 
 It would be 
more common to place it in the actions occurring on stage, but this too misses the point.  
Aside from the obvious interdependence of the stage action on the script, stage, 
individual actors and so forth, the drama is only drama if it is presented to an audience.   
                                                 
97 For a similar assertion see Gerald Bruns, “The Hermeneutical Anarchist:  Phronesis, Rhetoric and the 
Experience of Art,” in Gadamer's Century:  Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Jeff Malpas, 
Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), 61. 
 
98 Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 126.  Also see Gadamer, Truth and Method, 115. 
 
99 Ibid. 
 
100 Ibid., 121. 
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of all these elements.  There is then no self-existent independent essence of drama to 
which one could point.   
Returning to Nāgārjuna’s examination of causality and the example of the tree 
one sees the point.  As an analogy, the tree is the drama that arises at the intersection of 
dependence relations.  Just as the tree depends mereologically on the leaves, branches 
and roots, which are also not mereologically basic; so too does the drama depend on the 
actors, stage and so forth.  The tree causally depends on the seed, water and so forth; 
while the drama depends on the writer, director and so forth.  Finally, as the tree is 
cognitively united and divide in order to be identified as the tree, so too is the drama; the 
perceiver of the tree is the audience of the drama.  The perceiver and the audience would 
be equally incorrect to suppose their own independence from the phenomena they are 
observing.  The tree and the drama only arise in relation to them.  At this point something 
else particularly interesting occurs; the divisions between causal, mereological and 
cognitive dependence begin to breakdown.  Remaining with the audience, it is not simply 
cognitively necessary; the audience is a (mereological) part of the drama and composes 
part of the causal field giving rise to it.   
Elucidating Gadamer’s “transformation into structure” helps to clarify these 
points.  “Only through this change [the transformation into structure] does play achieve 
ideality, so that it can be intended and understood as play.  Only now does it emerge as 
detached from the representing of players and consist in the pure appearance 
(Erscheinung) of what they are playing.”101
                                                 
101 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 110. 
 In the process of play occurring between the 
players something new arises, such as the above drama.  Gerald Bruns presents another 
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helpful example.102  He uses Duchamp and his ready-made art as an extreme case where 
the answer to what this transformation is becomes most obvious.  Duchamp presents a 
snow shovel or urinal as his latest work of art and it in fact does become art.  Ostensibly, 
however, there is no objective difference between the snow shovel (the object) and 
Duchamp’s art (the work).  How then does the shovel become art?  First, there is 
Gadamer’s transformation into structure.  “[W]hat existed previously [such as the snow 
shovel or urinal] exists no longer,”103
One may ask a similar question of chess, which does not as conveniently fit the 
subject/object distinction.
 and something new arises.  This transformation 
occurs because the object is transplanted into a world of play constituted by relations that 
create something anew in the mediated presentation between the object and the spectator.  
The snow shovel or urinal is placed in the world, or game, of art in which there are 
participants or players, among which is the shovel itself.  Arising between the shovel and 
the other participants is that particular work of art.   
104  In keeping with Gadamer’s linguistic analysis,105 what does 
it mean to call something a game of chess?  The game is not on the chess board; this 
would artificially cut off the players and violate the medial nature of play.  Nor is the 
game strictly speaking in the players or in a relation between their subjectivities or 
experiences.106
                                                 
102 Bruns, 62. 
  Rather the chess game “comes to life,” comes to presentation, as 
 
103 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 111. 
 
104 For art one may theoretically isolate the piece of art as object and the spectator as subject, where as in a 
game of chess or tennis this is not as easily done. 
 
105 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 104. 
 
106 Ibid., 121. 
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Gadamer prefers, or unfolds in the world that is created by all three “objects.”107
 One may see that there are already some parallels between Nāgārjuna’s arguments 
for śūnyatā using interdependence and Gadamer’s analysis of play.  In a sense, and in this 
particular area at least, the two just work in opposite directions.  Nāgārjuna generally 
begins with a phenomena that seemingly has inherent existence, such as a tree, and 
through reductio demonstrates that this phenomena in fact does not have inherent 
existence.  In contrast, Gadamer begins with multiple seemingly independent phenomena 
such as the audience, the actors, the stage, the script and so forth, and demonstrates how 
such phenomena combine in such a way to give rise to a new dependent phenomenon, the 
drama.  In both cases the phenomenon under investigation is dependent on the context in 
which it occurs.  Though the shovel, as a work of art, is dependent on the shovel as 
object, the work of art is equally dependent on the world in which it exists, and the 
subjects that inhabit that world.  So as the world and subjects change so too does the 
shovel as a work of art.  However, it is this divergence in the direction of Gadamer’s and 
Nāgārjuna’s analyses that makes the difference, particularly when dealing with how there 
may be multiple true interpretations rather than a single objective truth. 
 There is, 
then, now only one “object” the game (or work) of chess itself. 
 The problem becomes most apparent when one asks the following question:  Do 
the actors in the drama, its script, the shovel as object, the chessboard and its players, and 
so forth have essential existence independent of the play in which they engage?  This is 
the crucial question for both providing a firm foundation for Gadamer’s interpretive 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
107 Put in such terms, one may see the parallels with Ricoeur’s understanding of the “world that unfolds in 
front of the text.”  Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred:  Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, ed. Mark 
Wallace, trans. David Pellauer (Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 1995), 41-3. 
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pluralism and its expansion into his overall system.  The ability to do so ultimately comes 
from adopting Nāgārjuna’s metaphysically anti-realist and epistemologically anti-
objectivist position.  His response should be obvious; they, as in any seemly objectively 
existing elements involved in play, too are empty based on their being necessarily 
interdependent relations.  Gadamer’s response, in contrast, is not so clear.   
Suppose that according to Gadamer the shovel, the script and so forth do have an 
objective independent existence apart from any particular instance of play; where would 
that leave his overall system?  As Chapter One demonstrated, that would leave him open 
to objectivist critique.  The objectivist could then say that the one true understanding or 
knowledge of any thing lies in the thing itself.  The truth of the shovel as art would lie in 
the shovel as object.  Of course, the easiest pro-Gadamerian response would be that the 
truth of the shovel as art does not simply lie in the shovel as object but in the shovel as it 
occurs in the world of art.  This would diffuse the truth into that world making it 
impossible to point to one single “location” where the truth lies.  The problem here is 
similar to the problem encountered when the objectivist granted the initial positive 
contribution of prejudices to understanding; the objectivist could argue, admitting the 
difficulty of the endeavor, that one need only step outside that world to see how the truth 
of the shovel as art arises within it, thereby allowing a comprehensive and unitary 
understanding of the truth of the shovel as art.  The countermove would then be to argue 
that there is nothing outside the game being played.  “But,” says the objectivist, “if the 
shovel itself can exist outside any particular instance of play, then so too may the knower 
or interpreter.  In fact, the objective natures of each element in play could be investigated 
apart from that instance of play.  Even if there are too many elements in play to allow for 
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an exhaustive investigation, the more one does the closer one gets to that one objective 
truth of the matter.” 
From this arises the crucial question of how expansive the phenomenon of play is 
for Gadamer.  In fact, it appears that for Gadamer play is universal, or nearly so.  “The 
first thing we must make clear to ourselves is that play is so elementary a function of 
human life that culture is quite inconceivable without this element.”108
The fact that the mode of being of play is so close to the mobile form of nature permits us 
to draw an important methodological conclusion.  It is obviously not correct to say that 
animals too play, nor is it correct to say that, metaphorically speaking, water and light 
play as well.  Rather, on the contrary, we can say that man too plays.  His playing too is a 
natural process.  The meaning of his play too, precisely because—and insofar as—he is 
part of nature, is a pure self-presentation.  Thus in this sphere it becomes finally 
meaningless to distinguish between literal and metaphorical usage.
  Or, more 
emphatically: 
109
 
 
So play appears to be ubiquitous.  This alone, however, does not answer the question of 
how Gadamer does or should respond to the question of the objective existence of 
phenomena such as the shovel, the text, and so forth apart from play or any particular 
instance of it. 
 Moving closer to the answer requires moving from the universalism of play to the 
particularity of games.   
Games differ from one another in their spirit.  The reason for this is that the to-and-fro 
movement that constitutes the game is patterned in various ways.  The particular nature 
of a game lies in the rules and regulations that prescribe the way the field of the game is 
filled.  This is true universally, whenever there is a game.110
 
 
                                                 
108 Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 22; see also 124-5. 
 
109 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 105. 
 
110 Ibid., 107. 
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The point for now is that though play may be universal it is manifested in various distinct 
ways in games that are self-governing and relatively closed worlds.111
 Now, with Nāgārjuna’s help, it is possible to move backwards from Gadamer’s 
transformation into structure through play to a broader rejection of objective existence 
apart from play.  The shovel as work only exists as such in the game of art; move the 
shovel back to the shed and it again becomes merely a shovel.  Though even here, as 
Nāgārjuna would point out, the shovel does not have inherent self-existence (svabhāva), 
but rather exists in a net of interdependent relations, particularly as it relates to human 
subjects.  It exists in the game of agriculture or human culture generally.  It arises as a 
shovel between the human subject, the soil, her available intentions to dig, and so forth.  
“Certainly,” an objectivist may grant, “the notion or label ‘shovel’ may be relationally 
dependent; a plastic cup may be used as a shovel, and therefore be labeled as a shovel.  
But there are still objective facts about the shovel.  It has a definitive length, with an iron 
  For example, 
there are the games of chess, art (or specific genres of art), and language(s).  Each of 
these would then have their own rules determining the nature of players and elements 
within those games.  It is also important to note that such defining rules may have little to 
do with appearance, material constitution, and so forth, but are more often concerned 
with functional relations that a particular element has with other elements in the world of 
the game.  A pawn in a game of chess may be a metal bolt, a knight-like figurine, an 
actual human, or a classically designed plastic piece.  This is less important than the 
functional and relational properties given to the piece such as only being able to attack 
one space diagonally forward or being worth less than a knight. 
                                                 
111 Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 124. 
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blade of certain dimensions, and a handle constructed from a specific type of wood.”  But 
if one keeps in mind the arguments presented in Chapter Two these features, too, belong 
to a cognitive game.  “Wood,” length and so forth only interdependently arise between 
the knower and the shovel; they are therefore as equally dependent on the perceivers and 
the world in which they relate, as they are on the shovel as object.   
 What is the general consequence then of carrying Gadamer’s play to this 
Madhyamaka extreme?  First, there is no time or place in which an object is not found in 
some game; this is equally true of human subjects.  What is then taken by the objectivist 
to be an object with a definitive essence and properties that exist apart from the knowing 
subject does not in fact exist; rather what is taken as such an object only arises as a result 
of the interdependent relations occurring in the game.   If the game is changed so too is 
the “object.”  With this the object, and the subject for that matter, are removed.  There is 
nothing left for an objectivist to appeal to.  The reason the objectivist believes that there 
is an independent object to point to is that both exist in a world or game with particular 
rules that allow both to arise and interact.  Once this world and its rules are reified to the 
point of being taken for granted subjects, objects, and their modes of relation gain the 
veneer of factuality and objectivity.  Only then does the object seem to exist 
independently and only then is it possible to adequate certain beliefs and propositions to 
the object.   
The Epistemology of Interpretive Pluralism 
As hoped for, this new metaphysical foundation requires little change in Gadamer’s 
overall system.  This is particularly true for the epistemological components of 
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historically effected consciousness and prejudices.112  First, remember that for Gadamer, 
historically effected consciousness means that consciousness is “situated in the web of 
historical effects.”113  More than just being situated, however, consciousness is 
constituted by its placement in such a web.  The same is true of the object itself.  One 
particularly gets this impression just prior to Gadamer’s analysis of Wirkungsgeschichte:  
“The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a 
relationship that constitutes both the reality of history and the reality of historical 
understanding.”114  This has the further consequence of placing the “subject” and the 
“object” of understanding on equal ground.  Since the historical school it has been 
recognized that objects in history are the products of their historical and cultural relations.  
What Gadamer adds is that consciousness as understanding is equally and essentially “a 
historically effected event.”115
                                                 
112 Again, dividing epistemology and ontology in Gadamer’s work is slightly artificial, particularly in 
discussions of historically effected consciousness and prejudice since our mode of being is determined by 
them.  What is being isolated as epistemological here is the way in which they determine how and what we 
may come to know or understand.   
  Consciousness and its objects are then both players in the 
game of understanding.  The truth of the text, historical event, or piece of art then arises 
between them as the true work of understanding that is equally dependent on the 
“subject” as it is on the “object” in the relation.  What then makes it impossible for the 
objectivist to counter is the fact that both poles of that relation are equally dependent on 
other historical and cultural relations.  There is no “thing” to which the objectivist may 
point and say “Here is where the truth lies; your understanding must conform to this.”  As 
 
113 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 300. 
 
114 Ibid., 299. 
 
115 Ibid. 
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Gadamer states, “[I]t is clearly an incorrect description of this understanding to speak of 
an object existing in itself and of the subject’s approach to it.  The truth is that historical 
understanding always implies that the tradition reaching us speaks into the present and 
must be understood in this mediation—indeed, as this mediation.”116
 This then continues to the individual prejudices composing historically effected 
consciousness.  Here some slight amending may be necessary.  As Chapter One showed 
prejudices are simultaneously the limit and the positive possibility of any understanding 
at all.  As limits, and in keeping with Gadamer’s analysis of play, they are like the rules 
of a game.  They constrain the number of possible moves.  But this limiting is actually 
concomitant with the positive possibility they give to any understanding at all.  Here 
prejudices may be seen as the epistemological counterpart to the metaphysical 
interdependence of historical and cultural phenomena.
 
117  We are able to engage an 
object of understanding because that object has some relation with us.  We are a product 
of them as much as they are a product of us.  This provides the legitimacy of Gadamer’s 
statement that we belong to history more than history belonging to us.118  One of the 
tasks Gadamer gives to hermeneutics takes this even a step further:  “The interpreter’s 
belonging to his object…now acquires a concretely demonstrable significance, and it is 
the task of hermeneutics to demonstrate it.”119
                                                 
116 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 325. 
  With this it is perhaps better not to think 
 
117 See, for example, Ibid., 278. 
 
118 Ibid. 
 
119 Ibid., 254. 
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of prejudices as latently carried around by the subject but as only arising in the encounter 
with the object of understanding.   
The Text 
How does this all then affect one of Gadamer’s main aims and the most notable use of 
hermeneutics, the interpretation of traditionary material?  First, there is no text in the way 
an objectivist or realist may think.  Given all the arguments presented until now, this may 
still be difficult for some to accept.  There are, after all, letters and words on a page.  But 
hermeneutics is not actually interested in words or sentences on a page.  Elucidating the 
following passage may help clarify this point:   
Every age has to understand a transmitted text in its own way, for the text belongs to the 
whole tradition whose content interests the age and in which it seeks to understand itself.  
The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not depend on the 
contingencies of the author and his original audience.  It certainly is not identical with 
them, for it is always co-determined also by the historical situation of the interpreter and 
hence by the totality of the objective course of history (emphasis added).120
 
 
First, hermeneutics is interested in meaning.121  Meaning, however, only arises, according 
to Gadamer’s use of the hermeneutic circle, in the interrelation between the parts and the 
whole.122  Even a single letter or word only has meaning in a certain context, and this 
context is not limited to the bounded text.  It was created in a cultural and historical 
horizon to carry meaning.  This may lead some, such as E.D. Hirsch Jr., to regard the 
author’s intention or the text’s reception by its original or intended audience to be the 
arbiters of the true meaning of the text.123
                                                 
120 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 296. 
  But the text arises in front of the author just as 
 
121 For example see Ibid., 365. 
 
122 See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 291 and 293; Jean Grondin, “Gadamer's Basic Understanding of 
Understanding,” in The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, ed. Robert Dostal (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 46-50. 
123 Hirsch, 1-23, esp. 10-14. 
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the painting arises in front of the artist, or the drama in front of the audience and actors.  
Though humans composed and bound the book, there is no one thing to point to and say 
“There’s the meaning!”  Jean Grondin makes the point succinctly when he states, “To 
understand, in Gadamer’s sense, is to articulate (a meaning, a thing, an event) into words, 
words that are always mine, but at the same time those of what I strive to understand.”124  
The true text arises between the interpreter and the text.  As both the interpreter and the 
text are historical and cultural events with prejudices arising between them, then the true 
text is always different.  This is why Gadamer may say that “understanding is not merely 
a reproductive but always a productive activity as well.”125  Or when he states “that 
neither the knower nor the known is ‘present-at-hand’ in an ‘ontic’ way.”126
  
  If there is no 
real text that exists independent of context, to which the interpreter belongs, then there is 
no single location for a one true meaning of the text leaving epistemological objectivism 
no metaphysically self-existent “object” to appeal to.  There then can be only multiple 
true interpretations of the text, or Gadamer’s interpretive pluralism. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
124 Grondin, “Gadamer's Basic Understanding of Understanding,” 41. 
 
125 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 296, 308. 
 
126 Ibid., 252. 
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Conclusion 
 It is now apparent how Gadamer may completely avoid objectivism.  If objects of 
interpretation only arise in relation to the object and its interpreter, and they in turn are 
ultimately determined by other relations, then there is no metaphysical anchor for an 
objectivist epistemology.  But what of the other horn of the dilemma, relativism or 
interpretive nihilism?  Without careful management the rejection of objectivism may lead 
to relativism or interpretive nihilism, and, in fact, this is a common critique of Gadamer.  
Often the attempt to avoid relativism leads to positions, such as Wachterhauser’s and 
Hirsch’s, that move Gadamer and hermeneutics more generally back to a more objectivist 
position.  As such, for the above argument to be effective, some account of how 
relativism or interpretive nihilism may be avoided based on this new foundation must be 
given. 
Gadamer does explicitly reject interpretive nihilism just as he rejects the ossifying 
tendency of objectivism: “One way of understanding a work, then, is no less legitimate 
than another.  There is no criterion of appropriate reaction.  Not only does the artist 
himself possess none—the aesthetics of genius would agree here; every encounter with 
the work has the rank and rights of a new production.  This seems to me an untenable 
hermeneutic nihilism.”127  One may recall that this path is also rejected by Nāgārjuna.128
                                                 
127 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 82. 
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Though this topic is too intricate to allow more than broad strokes at this time, both 
Nāgārjuna and Gadamer may again mutually benefit one another.   
First, Nāgārjuna makes a distinction between ultimate and conventional truth, the 
latter being akin to Gadamer’s understanding of tradition (MMK 24:8).  Here for 
Nāgārjuna, ultimate truth is simply the interdependence, and therefore emptiness, of 
everything (MMK 24:18).129
                                                                                                                                                 
128 See the Dedicatory Verse of the MMK and MMK 24.  See also Khapa, 24 and 324-6; Nāgārjuna, The 
Dispeller of Disputes, 46-8. 
  Despite what one may initially think, Nāgārjuna does not 
disparage conventional truth in favor of ultimate truth.  Both are in fact truths and they 
too are co-dependent.  As he states, “Without a foundation in the conventional truth/The 
significance of the ultimate cannot be taught” (MMK 24:10a-b).  First, to relegate 
conventional truth would imply that there is a reality, and a truth about it, apart from our 
engagement with it.  It should by now be obvious that Nāgārjuna could not support such a 
position.  In fact, our cultural and linguistic practices are integral in creating the world 
and its objects.  This follows from the above accounts of cognitive dependence and the 
integral role of the “subject.”  Subsequently, it is that culturally and linguistically created 
world that must be investigated to find interdependence and emptiness.  If the world is 
created by virtue of our linguistic and cultural practices, then there is no other way to 
investigate ultimate truth than by those means.  So, for example, there is such a thing as a 
tree.  This again speaks to the fact that emptiness does not mean non-existence.  It then is 
 
129 Also see Khapa, 495-6. 
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justifiable to talk about the tree existing.  But once investigated properly the tree is shown 
not to have independent existence.  This does not mean that the tree does not exist.130
This, however, is obviously metaphysical, and what is currently at issue is how 
Gadamer and Nāgārjuna would deal with epistemological nihilism or relativism.  As a 
reminder, just as Nāgārjuna’s arguing for emptiness does not entail non-existence, so too 
does the fact that he argues for the interdependence of objects of knowledge, means of 
knowledge, and subjects does not mean that there is no knowledge to be had.   In its 
simplest terms, for Nāgārjuna, the possible range of knowledge or understanding of 
something will be inhibited by the relations that compose that thing, by the relations that 
compose the subject, and perhaps most importantly the relation between the thing and the 
subject.  Though, as with Gadamer’s prejudices, this also provides the positive possibility 
for engagement with the object.  There should be some additional obvious similarities 
between Gadamer’s understanding of the composition of traditionary material and the 
interpreter.  Remember, for example, that as humans we are constituted by our placement 
within “the web of historical effects” constituting our world.
  
131  Similarly, the 
traditionary material has its placement in a web-constructed world.  But these two worlds 
are not completely alien to one another; for “our understanding will always retain the 
consciousness that we too belong to that world, and correlatively, that the work too 
belongs to our world.”132
This begins to address why, for Nāgārjuna and Gadamer, there are justifiable 
similarities and differences between interpretations.  For example, the relations that 
 
                                                 
130 For example see Khapa's elucidation of nihilism Ibid., 23. 
131 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 300. 
 
132 Ibid., 290. 
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compose trees will be largely alike.  Similarly, the means to knowledge that compose 
human perception are for the most part the same.  So when two individuals see the same 
tree, their perception of it will be largely similar.  What creates the greatest variations are 
the historical and cultural relations composing the subject.  Take, for example, the 
difference between the “common sense” perception and the natural scientific perception 
of a hippopotamus.  Given its appearance and location common perception may come to 
the conclusion that they are related to elephants, rhinoceroses, or pigs.  (The fact that one 
may even wonder what and how animals are related is a new cultural phenomenon.)  In 
fact, according to the game of natural science they are most closely related to whales and 
porpoises. Or, even in the world of “common sense” there may be divergence.  While 
both the common zoo-goer and the African native may have no knowledge of 
evolutionary biology’s taxonomy, and therefore must depend on more direct perception, 
nevertheless they may have comparatively different perceptions of a hippopotamus.  For 
one it may be a large lethargic animal with little real significance other than as a part of 
weekend entertainment; for the other it may in fact be a real threat to life and livelihood.  
It seems doubtful that Nāgārjuna would find either more true than the other.  How a 
hippopotamus is conceived is legitimate in each of these cases.  The difference between 
the two is simply the rules that create and restrain the possible modes of interpretation 
and understanding.  But the rules of knowledge are not simply based on cultural and 
historical whim; rather they are also based on the hippopotamus and its relations.  This is 
how there can be both legitimate similarities and difference concerning interpretation and 
understanding.   
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Gadamer’s methodologically-open accounts of how legitimate and illegitimate 
interpretations may be discriminated can clarify some of these points.  Specifically 
dealing with how fore-meanings may be challenged, he states, “I think we must say that 
generally we do so [question the appropriateness of fore-meanings] in the experience of 
being pulled up short by the text.”133  More specifically, relatively speaking, the 
interpreter is “pulled up short” when the expected meaning of the whole is not coherent 
with the continually emerging parts.  “The harmony of all the details with the whole is 
the criterion of correct understanding.  The failure to achieve this harmony means that 
understanding has failed.”134  So interpretations of trees, hippos, texts and so forth are 
limited in their range of possible legitimate interpretations by the relations that compose 
the thing being interpreted.  But the range of legitimate interpretations is also open in the 
sense that the object of interpretation is partially determined by its relation to the 
interpreter and the relations composing the interpreter.  As he states, “[T]his openness 
always includes our situating the other meaning in relation to the whole of our own 
meaning or ourselves in relation to it.”135
Clarifying what “event” and “mediation” mean for Gadamer and Nāgārjuna may 
help to demonstrate why truths are necessarily multiple and yet not relative in the strong 
sense of the word.  First, “event” obviously privileges time and change over space and 
   
                                                 
133 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 270. 
 
134 Ibid., 291.  With this, if one were to argue for Gadamer fitting into some established epistemological 
category, coherentism would be a viable candidate.  In fact, Wachterhauser argues as much in Brice 
Wachterhauser, “Gadamer's Realism:  The 'Belongingness' of Word and Reality,” in Hermeneutics and 
Truth, ed. Wachterhauser (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 154.  Unfortunately, he 
also connects this to a type of correspondence theory of truth that would leave Gadamer vulnerable to 
objectivist attacks. 
 
135 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 271. 
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stability.  For heuristic purposes time may then be divided synchronically and 
diachronically.136  Continuing with Gadamer’s example of drama let B stand for a 
particular drama, such as Hamlet. As Gadamer states, “the work of art cannot simply be 
isolated from the ‘contingency’ of chance conditions in which it appears,” and the work 
of art is necessarily tied to its presentation. 137
This also points to the topic, inherited from Heidegger, of disclosure.  Hamlet or 
the hippopotamus only arise as objects of interpretation within a pre-given interpretive 
framework.  They become objects of investigation and interpretation within this 
framework.  As such this pre-given framework has already determined the nature of the 
phenomena and the rules of engagement.  The range of possible legitimate ways of 
understanding them have then already been set by the framework in which they arise.    
  So with each performance of Hamlet it 
will be different.  Let B, then, be the first or “original” performance of Hamlet and B´ be 
some later performance.  A and C are then synchronic phenomena contemporary to B that 
in part determine B.  It should be noted that A and C stand for things both external, such 
as general cultural trends, and internal, such as particular actors or audiences, to B.  Just 
as B changes to B´, so too do A and C change to A´ and C´.  This necessarily makes B´ 
different from B.  But B´ could not legitimately be anything, for it is in part determined 
by a succession of previous Bs.  Also since A and C in part determined B, and A and C 
give rise to A´ and C´, then the possibilities of B´ are also indirectly constrained by the 
original horizon in which B occurred.   
                                                 
136 Much of what follows is derived from Mark C. Taylor, “Toward an Ontology of Relativism,” Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion 46, no. 1 (March 1978): 41-61. 
 
137 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 115. 
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So, in fact, just as prejudices are simultaneously the limits and positive possibility 
of understanding at all, so too are the interpreter’s and the object’s general positions in 
their webs of relations.  Since there is no independent inherent essence to either and since 
they are co-determinative, any shift in the position of one creates a correlative shift in the 
position of the other.  The truth of both then moves as well.  But such moves cannot be 
arbitrary.  Though one may interpret a dolphin out of a tree or Mary Poppins out of 
Crime and Punishment, such interpretations would not be judged legitimate.  They have 
broken the rules of tradition, and the rules of the world that have already given rise to the 
phenomena.   
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